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Abstract 
In the US, experts are often called upon to provide evidence during criminal trials regarding eye-
witness identification research. A key factor relates to issue of probative value. To what extent 
are findings from the laboratory studies generalizable to the real-world? In order to answer this 
question, this article explores the issue of eyewitness ecology, a term referring to the 
environmental context in which people witness crimes, which includes characteristics of 
perpetrators and the viewing conditions, as well as the identification context. Specifically, we 
explore the extent to which the typical eyewitness ecology found in the laboratory studies 
reflects or is similar to real-world conditions. We coded the characteristics of the published 
literature on criminal identification in the laboratory (N = 309), and the results were compared to 
the characteristics of a stratified random sample of felony cases (N = 721) obtained from a large 
metropolitan district in the United States. This analysis demonstrated that in the criminal cases 
compared to the laboratory studies, duration of exposure to the culprit and retention interval 
length were significantly longer, and weapons, violence, and showup identifications were more 
prevalent. Additionally, the laboratory studies and criminal cases differed with respect to 
participant/witness race. These findings indicate a need to broaden the range of conditions 
employed in the laboratory to increase the applicability of eyewitness identification research to 
the legal system. 
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Testing the Reflection Assumption: 
A Comparison of Eyewitness Ecology in the Laboratory and the Field 
 
In the US, experts in psychology and the law are often called upon to share their 
knowledge and understanding of the eyewitness identification literature with legal practitioners. 
For eyewitness experts, this often means testifying for the defence regarding the factors that can 
negatively impact eyewitness memory (e.g., Kassin et al., 2001; Kassin et al., 1989; Pezdek, 
2009), or making policy recommendations for the handling and preservation of eyewitness 
testimony (e.g., Wells et al., 1998). Inherent in these applications is a reflection assumption: a 
term we use to refer to the presumption that the research conditions found in eyewitness 
identification research reflects the eyewitness context in "real-world" cases. Stated another way, 
individuals summarising how different factors affect eyewitness performance are assuming that 
the empirical findings, the vast majority of which come from laboratory studies, will generalise 
to real-world cases (e.g., Pezdek, 2009; Yarmey, 2001). However, whilst the reflection 
assumption may be reasonable, it has been given little systematic empirical treatment.  
Many of the debates regarding the applicability of laboratory studies to the legal system 
have revolved around the question of generalisability. Some have argued that we are in a position 
to generalise because the laboratory methods used to study eyewitness identification are diverse 
enough to capture the essential characteristics of real-world crimes (e.g., Deffenbacher, 1984; 
Haber & Haber, 2000; Loftus, 1983; Pezdek, 2009; Yarmey, 1997; Yarmey, 2001), whereas 
others have cautioned that we must be sensitive to differences between the two settings with 
respect to the environmental and emotional context in which eyewitness identifications are 
carried out (e.g., Konečni & Ebbesen, 1986; Elliott, 1993; Flowe et al., 2009; Malpass & Devine, 
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1981; Pachella, 1986; Yuille, 1993). For example, Weiner and colleagues pointed out that some 
laboratory studies may oversimplify the visual behaviour of actual witnesses, as participant 
witnesses have their attention directed to the perpetrator, making generalisations difficult. Yuille 
and Wells (1991) have  argued for the necessity for more comparisons between experimental 
research and field contexts so that the similarities and differences between the two can be 
enunciated. Although we would also want to know how memory performance between 
experimental research and field contexts differs, a more basic and unanswered question is: How 
different are eyewitnessing conditions in the laboratory and in actual criminal cases?  
 In this article, we examine eyewitness ecology, a term we coin here to refer to the context 
in which people witness crimes and take eyewitness identification tests, both in the laboratory 
and in real-world. The aim is to describe the ecological range that has been employed in 
laboratory research,1 and compare it to those found in real-world cases. The primary reason to 
undertake this study is because the results from laboratory research are often applied to 
eyewitnesses in the real-world. First, a search of U.S. appellate cases on Lexis/Nexis database 
reveals that eyewitness experts testify in a wide range of different types of cases. When experts 
testify in these cases, the underlying assumption is that the eyewitness ecologies in the laboratory 
studies are similar enough to real-world eyewitness environments to warrant theoretical 
generalisation. Our focus on eyewitness ecology is inspired by the work of Egon Brunswik, who 
argued that researchers should particularise their experiments such that they are representative of 
the ecology, or habitat, to which generalisations are intended (Hammond & Stewart, 2001). 
Second, procedural recommendations2 derived from laboratory research affect all cases in the 
legal system once they are implemented, not just potentially problematic cases in which the 
                                                 
1 Throughout, the laboratory studies will be interchangeably referred to as ‘laboratory studies’ or ‘the studies’. 
2 Relating to, for example, best practice regarding the collection and preservation of eyewitness evidence.  
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witnessing conditions are poor. Accordingly, it is important to compare the range of eyewitness 
ecologies in studies with those found in real-world cases and assess the extent to which they 
overlap. In the main, we are undertaking what Malpass and colleagues (2008) referred to as a 
study space analysis, wherein individual factors in each of the studies (e.g., independent 
variables, dependent variables, methodological and procedural strategies) are defined in a matrix. 
Subsequently, the individual study matrices are merged so that each entry identifies the number 
of studies that utilised the corresponding characteristics.   
 The first objective of the research was to analyse the overall distribution of the conditions 
found in the laboratory and ‘archival cases’: real-life felony cases that were referred for 
prosecution. Second, the ecological conditions of laboratory and archival cases were compared to 
determine whether there are areas in which additional research seems warranted. For instance, 
how long are eyewitnesses exposed to the culprit in the archives and in the laboratory? How 
often are eyewitnesses subjected to violence? How often do eyewitnesses interact with the 
perpetrator before the onset of the crime? What are the lower and upper limits for the retention 
interval between the crime and the identification test? Does the retention interval length vary 
depending on the type of identification procedure employed? Answers to such questions can 
offer some guidance to researchers who are interested in utilising real-world parameters to 
inform the types of procedures and methods they use to study eyewitness identification in the 
laboratory. Our study space analysis revealed differences between the real-life cases and 
laboratory studies, particularly with respect to the race of the participant/witness, the duration of 
exposure to the culprit and retention interval length, and the use of weapons, violence, and 
showup identifications. 
 




Sampling. A comprehensive literature search was performed using the Psychological 
Abstracts Information Services (PsycINFO) and PsychARTICLES. PsychINFO covers 
publications from almost 2,500 scholarly peer reviewed journals from more than 50 countries 
and PsychARTICLES covers 110 journals, including all APA published journals and Canadian 
Psychological Association journals. Our search covered the years 1597-2014, which are dates 
that coincide with a recent National Academy of Sciences report on eyewitness research 
(National Research Council, 2016). A selection of key words and title word searches related to 
our project aim (e.g., eyewitness, lineup) were entered as appropriate. Our only criteria for 
inclusion were that study participants were presented with a lineup or a showup task. We chose 
to include only published laboratory studies, because courts, in determining reliability, may 
consider whether the scientific evidence and methodology has been tested and subjected to peer 
review or publication and generally accepted by the research community (United States v. 
Williams (583 F.2d 1194 (2nd Cir. 1978), United States v. Downing (753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 
1984), Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993)). From this search, 
the features of 444 studies from 309 peer-reviewed published papers, involving 93,189 
participants were coded (218 papers included 1 experiment, 63 papers included 2 studies, and 28 
papers included 3 or more studies). The journals in which these studies most frequently appeared 
were as follows: 82 studies (18%) were published in ‘Law and Human Behavior’, 77 (17%) in 
the ‘Journal of Applied Psychology’, and 72 (16%) in ‘Applied Cognitive Psychology’.3 
                                                 
3 Due to space limitations, it is not possible to cite all the laboratory studies included in the analysis. Please contact 
the corresponding author for a complete list. 
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Of these selected studies, 53% presented the target (i.e., the person being observed, such 
as the culprit) in a video, 13% live in a laboratory, 10% in a photograph, 9% live in an 
auditorium or a classroom, 9% live in a natural setting, 5% in a slide sequence, and 1% in a 
composite drawings or audio tape. The target was portrayed under conditions that were not 
criminal in 38% of the studies (e.g., laboratory participants memorized a photograph, or field 
participants were asked to identify a customer or a researcher with whom they had previously 
interacted). In the remaining studies the target committed theft in 35%, robbery in 14%, other 
types of crimes in 4%, a bomb plot in 3%, assault in 2%, burglary in 2%, and vandalism in 1% of 
the studies.  
Coding Scheme.  We recorded the number and type of independent variables investigated, 
whether the independent variables were correlational, how the variables were manipulated 
(between or within subjects) and the setting in which the experiment took place (laboratory, 
home, store, or other natural setting). In addition, the number and type of participants recruited 
and participant demographics were coded as the primary “eyewitness” variables. The 
“perpetrator” characteristics gathered from the laboratory studies included the number of targets 
shown, target physical features, and whether the target was disguised. For the witnessing 
condition variables, we coded whether participants were “victimized”, exposed to a weapon, 
witnessed the crime alone or in a group, and whether participants knew they were in a memory 
experiment prior to seeing the event. The critical event (i.e., the simulated crime, or other 
circumstances in which the target was portrayed) and target exposure duration (in minutes) were 
also recorded when available. Finally, characteristics of the identification task that we coded 
were: whether participants were asked to describe the target, type of identification task 
administered, the actual and functional size of the lineup, method of lineup presentation 
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(simultaneous or sequential), whether the target was present, how foils were chosen (with or 
without piloting), who constructed the lineup (experimenter, local police or other method), and 
the description and identification retention intervals. 
In circumstances where certain information was not provided, we did not speculate as to 
the nature of the missing data values.  For congruency with the archival analysis, data regarding 
“culprit” characteristics were based on the total number of simulated perpetrators, and data 
pertaining to “eyewitnesses” was analysed based on the total number of simulated eyewitnesses.  
  
Archival Cases 
 Sampling. The characteristics of the laboratory studies were compared to a stratified 
random sample of 721 felony cases (robbery n = 238, rape n = 301, assault n = 182) that were 
referred for prosecution, by the San Diego Police Department, to the San Diego District 
Attorney’s Office between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 1995. Of these cases, 65% (n = 
468) were accepted for prosecution (n = 208, rape; n = 176, robbery; n = 84 assault), whilst in 
the others the issuing District Attorney dropped the charges against the defendant.4 These three 
specific types of crime were selected because they were serious felony offenses that were most 
likely to involve eyewitness testimony as a pivotal factor in each case. In these cases, a suspect 
had been arrested by the police, and the case had been handed over to the prosecutor’s office to 
determine whether charges should be filed. Both rejected and accepted cases were included in 
the sample because we wanted to include a wide range of eyewitness ecologies. On one end of 
the spectrum, the rejected cases might be largely representative of cases in which the eyewitness 
                                                 
4 Recommended guidelines for the collection of eyewitness evidence impact police handling of all cases, regardless 
of whether the D.A. issues charges. Therefore, any attempt to determine how well laboratory research conditions 
generalise to real crime situations should also include cases that do not reach the prosecution stage. 
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ecology was likely to lead to poor memory formation, whereas on the other end of the spectrum, 
the accepted cases might be largely representative of circumstances in which the eyewitness 
ecology promoted stronger memory representations.  
 The sample represents 1,319 eyewitness testimonies (403 of the witnesses were from 
robbery cases, 450 from rape cases and 466 from assault cases). The number of witnesses in each 
case ranged from 1-10, but typically the cases involved the testimony of 1 eyewitness (Robbery: 
40% involved 1 eyewitness, range = 1-9; Rape: 75% involved 1 eyewitness; range = 1-10; 
Assault: 42% involved 1 eyewitness, range = 1-10).  
 Coding Scheme. In line with the laboratory studies, case files were coded both at the 
defendant level and the individual eyewitness level. With the exception of the exposure duration 
variables (crime and target), lineup functional size, and weapon presence and use, the coding 
procedures previously described were utilized. As for the exposure duration variables, because 
this information was not actually available, estimates of these time intervals were made when 
coders felt they could reasonably approximate it from the eyewitness statements (if any) 
described in the police crime report. Coders estimated lineup functional size if a copy of the 
photographic lineup was available in the case file. Functional size was estimated based on the 
number of persons in the lineup that fitted the physical description of the culprit. Finally, for 
weapon presence and use, an eyewitness' awareness of the threat or use of a weapon, rather than 
the actual presence and use of weapon, was coded from the archival case files. 
 For descriptive purposes, and to assist with the design of future experiments, a few 
additional variables were coded in the archival cases. These included viewing conditions (i.e., 
lighting and distance away from the perpetrator), whether the police reported that the witness 
was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, and distinctive physical features of the 
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perpetrator noted by the police in the report at the time of the arrest. These variables were not 
coded in the experimental studies because the information was usually not provided in the 
papers. 
 For the purposes of this study, a "case" was defined by a single defendant, and in the 
event of a file involving felony complaints against more than one individual, the file was seen as 
involving more than one case and was coded accordingly. As defendants were often charged 
with more than one crime, cases were assigned to a crime category (rape, robbery, or assault) 
based on the most serious charge reported on the felony complaint. The variables coded were 
taken from a number of sources in the case files, such as the crime report, arrest report, probation 
officer’s report, and the investigator’s follow-up report. Due to the large volume of case files, the 
completeness and content of the case files varied from case to case (case files ranged in size from 
a single file folder to several large boxes). As a result of this, the number of responses varied 
across each variable.  
 Coder Reliability. Before coding information from the criminal case files, the 46 coders 
involved in this portion of the study were provided with detailed written and verbal instructions, 
along with a number of practice cases to code. Intercoder reliability was measured by assigning 
one randomly chosen case to each of the coders at some point during the data collection process 
and monitoring intercoder agreement for the variables in this case. Given the extremely basic 
level of coding involved in this study, the agreement between the coders was extremely high. To 
measure intercoder reliability for variables that required estimations on the part of the coder, 
Cronbach's alpha was computed to examine reliability for each variable (see Howell, 2002). The 
values obtained for these alphas were .86 for exposure duration, .98 for description latency, and 
.89 for identification latency.  
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Data Analysis. Comparisons between the laboratory studies and the archival cases were 
made at both the defendant and the eyewitness level. For the categorical variables, chi-square 
analyses were performed to determine the statistical relationship between the variables 
manipulated by researchers, and those naturally occurring in the real-world. Since the retention 
interval and duration of exposure data were not normally distributed, the Mann-Whitney U 
statistic was used to compare the archives and laboratory studies on these variables (see Howell, 
2002).  
 Archival results were expected to differ for some variables depending on the type of 
crime committed (e.g., the majority of witnesses in rape cases are female). For these variables, 
separate analyses were conducted for each crime category (rape, robbery and assault). 
 
Exploring the Differences in Eyewitness Ecologies  
In this section we provide an overview of the differences in the eyewitness ecology 
between the real-life cases and laboratory studies. The analysis is structured around the following 
elements: independent variables, eyewitness, perpetrator, witnessing conditions, and suspect 
identification. Thereafter, in the discussion section, we develop a more detailed analysis of the 
major differences pertaining to race, the duration of exposure to the culprit and retention interval 
length, and the use of weapons, violence, and showup identifications. 
  
Independent Variables  
Of the 444 studies, 77% employed a true experimental design, 20% included both 
experimental variables and correlational variables (such as participant age or personality traits), 
and the remaining 3% exclusively examined correlational variables. A one-way chi square 
Running head: TESTING THE REFLECTING ASSUMPTION 12 
 
analysis indicated that this distribution of research designs departs from equiprobability chance 
expectation, χ2 (2, N = 444) = 400.96, p < .0001. The laboratory studies typically manipulated 2 
(mode) independent variables (M = 2.55, SD = 1.44, range = 1 to 14 independent variables). 
Table 1 displays the top ten independent variables found in the research literature. For every 
variable listed, except for “memory ability” (which was most often operationalized as a 
continuous variable), the mode number of design levels was 2. 
 
Eyewitnesses 
 Gender. Participant gender was available for coding in 51% (n = 219) of the studies and 
for 95% (n = 1,251) of the archival witnesses. Across all crime categories, 43% of the research 
participants and 46% of the archival witnesses were male, a difference that is not statistically 
significant, χ2 (1, N = 51,906) = 3.70, p = .05. Gender composition in the archives varied by 
case type. Most real-world witnesses were male in robbery (65%) and assault (60%) cases, 
whereas the majority of the witnesses in rape (84%) cases were female, with the association 
between gender and case type being statistically significant, χ2 (2, N = 1470) = 761.61, p < 
.0001.  
 Age. The majority of the laboratory studies recruited college students to serve as 
witnesses (n = 296), and other adult populations (n = 51). Participants under the age of 18 (n = 
25) were recruited less frequently (65 studies drew subjects from multiple populations and 7 
studies did not report any sampling information). Across research participants, 69% were college 
students, 20% were from other adult populations, 10% were children and 1% were adolescents. 
The age of the participants ranged from 2 to 94 years (101 studies reported this information). For 
archival eyewitnesses (N = 1,133), the age range was 4 to 86 years, with the average age being 
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29.28 years (SD = 13.04, median = 26).  The age distributions for the archives and laboratory 
studies were not statistically compared owing to differences across them in how age information 
was recorded.  
Race. Race was known for 26,806 research participants (81 studies reported participant 
race) and for 1,142 archival eyewitnesses. The distribution of eyewitness race in the archives 
significantly differed from the distribution found in the laboratory studies, χ2 (4, N = 26120) = 
2103.81, p < .0001. Whereas 77% of laboratory witnesses were White, only 49% of real-world 
eyewitnesses were white.53As for other racial categories, the background of participants in the 
studies was: 3% Black, 7% Asian, 3% Hispanic, and 10% were designated as belonging to other 
racial categories. In the archives, the reported racial categories were: 18% Black, 6% Asian, 26% 
Hispanic, and less than 1% were reported to identify with other racial categories. The distribution 
of these other racial categories significantly differed across the archive and real-world cases, χ2 
(3, N = 6746) = 943.11, p < .0001.  In the real-world cases, 52% of the identification attempts in 
which the race of the eyewitness and suspect was known (N = 211) were cross-race.  As for the 
total of eyewitnesses, 42% of the witnesses were cross-race and this information was reported for 
1073 eyewitness. Only 60 laboratory studies reported both the race of the suspect and 
eyewitnesses simultaneously, and 63% of these (38 studies) employed either cross-race target or 
participants. 
Relationship to Target. The archival witnesses were acquainted with the suspect in 92% 
of the assaults, in 79% of the rapes, and in 21% of the robberies. However, in the laboratory 
studies none of the participants were acquainted with the target. In a few of the studies, 
                                                 
5 In describing the racial backgrounds of research participants, eyewitnesses, and defendants, we adopted the racial 
nomenclature that legal officials used in the case files. 
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researchers indicated that when subjects volunteered to participate and reported to the 
experimenter that they were familiar with some members of the lineup, they were immediately 
excluded from the data sample.  
 Alcohol and Drug Use. A total of 13% of all real-world witnesses were under the 
influence of drugs (n = 28), alcohol (n = 122) or a combination of the two (n = 26) at the time the 
crime was committed. Most of these witnesses (73%) were witnesses from the rape cases. A 
description of the culprit was given to the police by 45% of witnesses who were under the 
influence of drugs and/or alcohol (n = 79). Additionally, 22% of the intoxicated witnesses were 
provided with an opportunity to identify a suspect (n = 39); 44% of these cases involved 
defendants and witnesses previously unacquainted. Few eyewitness papers involved intoxicated 
participants (Harvey, Kneller, & Campbell, 2013; Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990; Yuille, Tollestrup, 
Marxsen, Porter, & Herve, 1998).  
 
Perpetrator 
Gender. The gender of the targets significantly varied in the archives compared to the 
laboratory studies, χ2 (1, N = 1492) = 89.48, p < .001. While both laboratory and actual criminal 
cases involved primarily male targets, the laboratory studies utilized a greater number of women 
(n =215) compared to the archives (n = 41). When women were employed as the target in the 
studies, 52% were portrayed in conditions that were noncriminal, 42% engaged in simulated 
thefts, 5% in burglary, and 1% in robbery scenarios. In relation to the archives, 64% of the 
female defendants were alleged to have committed robbery, 32% assault and 4% rape. For theft 
and robbery crimes, the proportion of female perpetrators/defendants did not differ significantly 
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across the archive and laboratory studies (14% versus 7%, respectively), χ2 (1, N = 239) = 1.92, 
p = .16. 
Age. Information was provided in 151 of the laboratory studies regarding the general age 
range of the culprit (rarely was the exact age of the culprit provided). In most studies, a college 
student or an adult under the age of 26 was the target (85%), followed by adults over the age of 
26 (14%). A child was the target in 1% of the studies. In the archives, the defendants were on 
average aged 29 years (SD = 9.10, range = 16 to 79, median = 28 years, n = 628). The age of the 
culprit/defendant could not be compared across the archive and laboratory studies owing to 
differences between the two in how this information was reported.      
Race. The distribution of target race (N = 620) in the archives significantly differed from 
the race distribution for targets found in the laboratory studies (N = 397, with 42% of the studies 
reporting this information), χ2 (4, N = 1017) = 299.22, p < .001. In the archives, 30% of the 
defendants were White, whereas 85% of the targets in the studies were White. With regard to the 
other racial categories found for the targets in the studies, 8% were Black, 2% were Asian, 3% 
were Hispanic, and less than 2% categorized as “other”. In the archives, the distribution was 33% 
Black, 3% Asian, 31% Hispanic, and 3% were categorized as “other”. The archive and 
laboratory studies with respect to these other racial categories significantly varied, χ2 (3, N = 
495) = 23.42, p < .0001. 
Disguises. The description(s) of the culprit given by the eyewitnesses included a disguise 
in 6% of the archival cases (n = 44). In most cases the items reported to disguise the perpetrator’s 
appearance most frequently were caps and hats (68%), followed by glasses (20%), bandanas 
(7%) and stockings (5%). In the laboratory studies, perpetrators less frequently wore a disguise 
compared to the archives, χ2 (1, N = 1694) = 9.22, p < .00001. Disguises were used by simulated 
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culprits in 5% of the studies (n = 25); with hats (36%), different clothing (12%), hairstyle (12%), 
headscarf (8%), glasses (8%), stocking (4%) a mask (4%), and sunglasses (4%), serving as the 
disguises. In 12% of the studies, no information was provided about the type of disguises. 
 Distinctive Features. Specifically distinctive physical features were noted in the police 
report  for 33% of the defendants (n = 241). Of these defendants, 63% had one or more visible 
tattoos, 17% had prominent scars on their body, 11% had faces with tattoos, scars, or some other 
unusual feature, and 3% had missing, broken or gold-capped teeth. None of the papers in the 
literature mentioned whether their culprits had such features, though one study manipulated 
whether the target wore an Elvis wig or had a chipped tooth (Searcy et al., 2000). As such, no 
statistical comparisons were made. 
 
Witnessing Conditions 
 Victimization. In the archives, 56% of the eyewitnesses were crime victims, whereas 7% 
of research subjects were led to believe that they were victims of a crime, a statistically 
significant difference, χ2 (1, N = 94,436) = 4113.93, p < .00001. Throughout the laboratory 
studies, the victimizations were limited to theft due to ethical reasons. Real-world witnesses were 
victimized 70%, 55%, and 42%, of the time in rape, robbery and assault cases, respectively.  
 Critical Event. In the laboratory studies, 47% of the participants were aware that they 
were taking part in an experiment before viewing the target. In cases where participants were not 
aware, 43% were presented with a noncriminal event and 99% were debriefed before the 
identification test was administered. Across participants who were aware from the beginning that 
they were taking part in an experiment, 40% were not told that they would be given an 
identification test until after the critical event was presented. It was unclear from the archival 
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records when witnesses became aware that they were in fact witnessing a crime; hence, no 
statistical comparisons were made in this regard.  
As the locations in which the critical event occurred were so different for the archives 
compared to the laboratory studies, only descriptive information will be provided here. In 9% 
(n=41) of the studies, there was no mention of where participants viewed the critical event. Of 
studies which did state where the critical event took place, 71% (n = 287) reported a laboratory 
setting, 19% (n = 77) a lecture hall setting, 7% (n = 27) in public places (4 studies presented the 
event in multiple settings), 2% (n=7) in the police station or military training service, 1% (n=3) 
online via internet,  in the participant’s home in 1 study, and in the fire station in 1 study. The 
crime location was revealed in 655 of the archive cases with the following locations/settings 
being reported:  at a residence (52%), on the street or in an alley (18%), in open public places 
(13%), in other outdoor settings (8%), in other indoor settings (3%), in multiple locations (3%) 
or in vehicles (1%).   
Alone or in a group. For 394 laboratory studies and 257 of the archive cases, information 
was available regarding whether the witnesses observed the crime by themselves or with other 
witnesses. The critical stimulus was viewed autonomously by a participant more often in the 
studies compared to the archives (51% versus 18%), χ2 (1, N =651) = 74.45, p < .001. 
Furthermore, in 222 of the archival cases it was clear that 2 or more witnesses were previously 
acquainted with one another. None of the research investigations reported whether witnesses 
were acquainted with one another prior to observing the event, and hence no statistical 
comparisons were made in this regard. 
Event Exposure. Table 2 presents the event and target exposure durations for the studies 
and the archives by the type of event witnessed. For the archival cases in which event duration 
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was estimable (n = 507), compared to the eyewitness studies (n = 335; 13 studies presented 
multiple events), event exposure time was considerably longer (Mann-Whitney U, z = -19.91, p 
< .0001) and the data were encompassed by a broader range of durations. For studies, the mean 
exposure time was 2.32 min (SD = 5.76, range = 0.03 to 40 min, and median = 1 min). For the 
archives, the criminal event lasted on average 59.87 minutes (SD = 390.75, range = .08 to 7200, 
and median = 8 min).  
Target Exposure. As shown in Table 2, witnesses (n = 403) in the archives were exposed 
to the target for a longer duration compared to research participants (Mann-Whitney U, z = -
16.42, p < .0001). Duration of exposure to the target was reported in 283 studies (4 studies 
involved multiple crime presentation); on average, research participants viewed the target for 
1.80 min (SD = 5.58, range = 0.03 to 40 min, and median = 0.4 min). Archival witnesses viewed 
the culprit for 65.74 min on average6 (SD = 205.17, range = 0.00 to 2423, and median = 7.8 
min). 72% of real-world eyewitnesses viewed the suspect’s face for 10 min or less and 44% of 
these witnesses saw the suspect for 3 minutes or less. This information was provided for 832 
eyewitnesses.  
Violence. Violence did not feature prominently in the laboratory studies, likely owing to 
ethical considerations; thus, no statistical comparisons across the laboratory and archives will be 
made with respect to violence. Only 2 studies manipulated the level of violence (Clifford & 
Hollin, 1981; Cutler et al., 1987).  None of the published papers examined the effect of prior 
exposure to the culprit before violence. In the real-world cases, 59% of eyewitnesses were 
exposed to violence (this variable was known for 1,251 witnesses). Of the witnesses exposed to 
violent events, 117 first interacted with the culprit during the violent act, whereas 176 first 
                                                 
6 That the mean duration of exposure to the culprit is longer compared to the mean crime duration is not unusual, as 
some witnesses viewed the culprit immediately before and after the crime. 
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interacted with the culprit before the violent act (for 46 witnesses, this variable was unknown). 
The remaining 399 eyewitnesses exposed to violence personally knew the culprit. Additionally, 
of witnesses who attempted to identify a stranger-culprit, 84% of those experiencing violence 
were between 0-36 inches away from the culprit, whereas only 44% of witnesses who were not 
subjected to violence were within this range of proximity. 
Weapon Exposure. A much larger proportion of archival witnesses were exposed to 
weapons (54%) compared to research participants (9%), χ2 (1, N = 94,508) = 3136.24, p < 
.0001. A total of 37 staged crimes involved weapons. Of witnesses who saw a weapon, 49% 
viewed a gun, 32%, a bomb, 8% a knife, 3% a syringe and 3% a bottle, 3% a truck (one study did 
not specify what the weapon was). Archival witnesses (N=1,046) viewed a greater variety of 
weapons than research participants (37% reported the culprit’s hands or feet were used as a 
weapon, 24% were exposed to a penis, 12% saw a firearm, 10% a knife, 7% a blunt instrument, 
1% a ligature, and 9% fell into the other category, which included weapons such as rocks, 
bottles, and vehicles). Moreover, several archival witnesses (n = 286) saw more than one type of 
weapon, whereas this was not the case for any of the research witnesses. Duration of weapon 
exposure in the archives ranged from 3 seconds to 15 hours, with eyewitnesses typically exposed 
for 1 minute. In the studies, duration of weapon exposure was often not reported, hence no 
statistical comparisons between the laboratory studies and the archives could be made. 
Suspect Identification 
Description. In the studies (37%), subjects were asked to give a description of the targets. 
In the archives, a description was given by 500 witnesses, 746 did not give a description, and one 
witness died before the investigators could obtain a description (this variable was known for 
1,247 witnesses). The proportion of participants who gave a description was significantly greater 
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in the archives compared to the laboratory studies (37% versus 40%, respectively), χ2 (1, N = 
94,436) = 5.06, p = .02. 
Identification Task Construction. Of course, the police arranged all the identifications in 
the archives. Unfortunately, the case files did not provide us with information on how the police 
selected the foils for the lineups. Therefore, statistical comparisons between the laboratory 
studies and the archives were not made, and only descriptive information will be provided. We 
will concentrate on how the lineups were constructed. Note that police are advised to construct 
lineups for a given target by selecting fillers (i.e., persons known by the police to be innocent of 
the crime) who resemble the witness’ description of the perpetrator (ref), which research 
suggests is a fair way to construct a lineup (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 
1999). Another approach that could be used is to select fillers based on how similar to the 
target/suspect they visually appear. The purpose of fillers is to decrease the odds that the witness 
identifies the suspect based on guessing alone. To serve this purpose, the fillers should not be too 
dissimilar in appearance to the target/suspect. Further, researchers and the police can pretest their 
lineup materials to ensure that they are fair and unbiased (see Tredoux, 1998). We focus on 
lineup construction in this section because it can play an important role in lineup identification 
accuracy, and thus, should be considered when generalising across laboratory and real world 
cases.  
In 67% of the laboratory studies, the researchers selected fillers for the lineup because the 
researchers simply thought the fillers appeared similar enough to the target. In the studies in 
which lineups were pretested, the fillers were selected on the basis of similarity ratings gathered 
from subject raters, who rated the similarity of the target/suspect against each of the fillers. The 
fillers were selected by matching them to a description of the target in 35% of the studies, by 
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matching them to the target’s photograph in 21%, by using other strategies in 20%, and no 
information was provided as to what strategy the researchers used in 24% of the studies. The 
lineups were mock witness tested in 28% of the studies to determine whether the fillers were 
adequate. The researchers asked the police to construct the lineup in 5% of the studies. 
Lineups size, or the total number of people who are in the lineup, varies across police 
jurisdictions, with 6 being the norm in the US and 9 being the norm in the UK, as examples. 
Lineup size in the laboratory studies ranged from 1 to 120, with 56% of the studies involving 6 
persons. However, the functional size of a lineup is also important. Functional size refers to the 
number of lineup persons who are similar in appearance to the target/suspect. Nominally, a 
lineup may contain 6 persons; but, if 4 fillers are not similar to the target/suspect, the functional 
size of the lineup will be 2 persons. The odds of a witness being able to identify the 
target/suspect based on guessing alone are higher in a lineup that has a functional size of 2 as 
opposed to 6 persons. Functional size can be determined based on pretesting the lineups using 
mock witnesses. The functional size of the lineup was determined in 16% of the studies, and 
ranged from 1 to infinity (in some studies, lineup member similarity was manipulated). Further, 
the position of the target/suspect in the lineup was reported in 49% of the studies. For a lineup in 
which the photographs are presented simultaneously to the witness, the photographs are usually 
arranged in a 3 x 2 array, with the first position being the leftmost photo in the top row, the 
second positon being the next photograph on the right, etc. It is important to ensure that the 
target/suspect does not always appear in the same position for every participant in case people 
are biased to select photos that appear in a certain position (e.g., the first or last photograph; see 
x for example). For the studies in which the positon of the target/suspect was provided, 59% 
counterbalanced or randomized the position of the target, 22% used a single position and 19% 
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utilized more than one position (typically 2 positions). Typically, the target was placed in 
positions 2 or 4 (27% of the studies used one of these positions).  
In the archives, “lineup size” or the number of persons presented in a given identification 
procedure ranged from 1 to 50, with 51% of all eyewitnesses presented with 1 person for 
identification. Thus, witnesses were often presented with live showups. This may be because 
witnesses are most likely to be asked to attempt an identification of the perpetrator when a 
suspect is immediately apprehended at the scene of the crime. Researchers and the courts have 
long considered showups suggestive; nevertheless, the police present live showups when public 
safety and the liberty of the suspect who has been detained are at issue (see Gonzalez, Ellsworth, 
& Pembroke, 1993 for a review of the legal issues and as well as a laboratory and archival study 
of showups versus lineups). In the present study, when photographic lineups were organised, 6 
persons were presented for identification (range = 1 to 9 persons) in 74% of the procedures. The 
functional size of the photographic lineups ranged from 1 to 9 persons. For 64% of the 6-person 
lineups, the functional size was estimated as 6 persons by the coders. The rate at which the target 
was placed in positions 1-6 was as follows: 10%, 31%, 21%, 17%, 16%, and 4%.  
Identification Procedure. As the methods used to identify suspects were so markedly 
different in the laboratory compared to the archives, no statistical analyses were conducted. In 
the archives, 31% of the witnesses (n = 406) were asked to identify the suspect, and lineup tests 
were presented significantly more often to victims compared to eyewitness bystanders (67% 
versus 33%) χ2 (1, N = 406) = 46.22, p < .0001. Of those presented with a lineup, 344 positive 
identifications of the suspect were made.7 Additionally, approximately 1% of the eyewitnesses in 
                                                 
7 Only the characteristics of the first identification test for each eyewitness were included in our analyses. We found 
that 25 eyewitnesses in the archives (6%) were presented with more than one opportunity to identify the suspect. 
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the archives who were given an identification test participated in the creation of a composite 
drawing, and none of the witnesses viewed mugshots prior to being given an identification test. 
Approximately 5% of the research participants viewed mugshots or a composite drawing before 
being given the identification test. Witnesses who were given an identification opportunity 
typically underwent one identification procedure (range: 1 to 2 opportunities). 
 As displayed in Table 3, while live showups were most often presented to real-world 
witnesses (51%), photographic lineups were most often presented to research participants (78%). 
Live showups were viewed by less than 1% of research participants, and no real-world witnesses 
viewed video lineups or listened to voice lineups. The lineup faces were viewed simultaneously 
by 74% of research participants, sequentially by 23%, 2% of participants were presented with 
showups and 1% with an elimination method. The researchers manipulated whether the target 
was present in the lineup for 67% of the participants. 16% of participants were shown only target 
present lineups, 9% of participants were shown only target absent lineups, and 8% of participants 
viewed both target present and target absent lineups.   
Table 4 presents identification outcomes in the archives by the type of identification 
procedure that was conducted and the relationship between the eyewitness and perpetrator. As 
demonstrated, most identifications in the archival cases were conducted via a live showup 
procedure. Additionally, 71% of witnesses asked to take identification tests were not acquainted 
with the perpetrator. 
Retention Intervals. Descriptive results are given in Figure 5. The majority of 
descriptions were made on the same day as the incident in both the archival cases (97%) and the 
studies (87%). The length of time between the crime and when participants were tested could be 
computed for 23,499 research participants (143 studies provided this information) and 139 
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archival witnesses. As can be seen from Figure 5, real-world compared to archival witnesses 
experienced longer delays between the crime and giving a description of the culprit. Real world 
witnesses also had a longer delay between the crime and when were given an identification 
opportunity. Furthermore, 105 studies did not provide the exact length of time between the crime 
and when participants were tested. In these studies, participants viewed the target, completed a 
filler task, and then were given the identification test in 12 of these studies. Participants viewed 
the target, described the target, and then completed the identification test in 45 studies. Thus, the 
delay between the crime and when participants were tested was likely quite minimal. In 48 of the 
studies, no information was given as to when the identification took place.  
Witnesses in real-world cases could potentially be asked to identify the culprit on 
occasions that follow their initial identification. To aid researchers in determining retention 
interval lengths in future studies, descriptive information about these occasions is as follows: the 
preliminary hearing typically occurred 30.52 days (SD = 29.77, range = 2.72 to 168.92, median = 
17.65 days, n = 106) after the crime, and the trial period typically occurred 149.45 days after the 
crime (SD = 90.95, range = 30.87 to 404.81, median = 103.06 days, n = 24). Of the 796 
witnesses involved in cases accepted for prosecution, 51% testified at the preliminary hearing. In 
the 24 cases that went to trial, 97% of the witnesses testified. Whether identification accuracy 
would be at the floor (i.e., very poor) and what factors may affect memory retention with delays 
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Our study space analysis revealed major differences between the police cases and 
laboratory studies and quantified the extent to which the characteristics that are related to 
identification accuracy have been studied in both archival cases and laboratory studies. For 
example, the archival analysis indicated that real-world eyewitnesses were more often male in 
robbery and assault cases, and more often female in rape cases. The average age of the 
eyewitnesses was 30 years, and half of the witnesses were White. Except in the robbery cases, 
most of the eyewitnesses had some degree of familiarity with the suspect prior to the crime. Most 
of the time eyewitnesses observed the criminal event in a group of two or more persons. More 
than half of the eyewitnesses interacted with the culprit before violence was involved. Further, in 
keeping with Horry, Halford, Brewer, Milne, and Bull’s (2014) archival analysis, we found more 
than half of eyewitnesses were victimized and exposed to a weapon. With respect to the culprits 
in the real-world cases, the majority were male and a third of the culprits were White. 
Approximately a third of the culprits had distinguishing features, such as facial tattoos and gold-
capped teeth. About a third of the witnesses were given an identification test, and most often, 
those who were given the test were victims rather than bystanders. The identification procedure 
most often used was a live showup procedure. In a live showup, the witness is shown the suspect 
live in person and asked whether this is the person who perpetrated the crime. In cases where a 
lineup was conducted, most often the suspect was placed in position 2. 
While there was some difference between the real and laboratory world for almost every 
characteristic we compared (the exceptions were the age and gender of the target and 
eyewitness), the discussion that follows will largely focus on the variables about which experts 
testify in the courtroom as being strongly related to identification accuracy (Kassin et al., 2001; 
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Pezdek, 2009): cross-race identifications, weapon exposure, exposure to violence, culprit 
exposure duration, retention interval to identification, and the type of identification task. 
 Meta-analyses of the own-race bias find that cross-race manipulations significantly 
decrease suspect identifications and increase mistaken identifications in the laboratory (Meissner 
& Brigham, 2001; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986).  Own-race bias is influenced by both perceptual 
expertise, where people have greater expertise with faces of their own-race than of other races, 
and in-group/out-group categorisation. Own race faces may be learned in a different manner than 
other race faces (see Ryder et al., 2015 for a review). Some evidence indicates that different 
types and depth of cognitive processing are partly responsible for the underlying mechanism of 
own-race bias. For example, own-race faces are found to be processed more holistically (Michel 
et al., 2006; Tanaka et al., 2004), processed more configurally (i.e., the interrelations of  salient 
facial features are processed more than individual facial features) (Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; 
Megreya et al., 2011) and encoded at a deeper level than other-race faces (MacLin et al., 2004). 
The results from different studies also suggest that own-race bias is reliable across most races 
(e.g., Goldstein & Chance, 1980; MacLin et al., 2001; Megreya, et al., 2011). Moreover, own-
race bias influences identification accuracy in the laboratory studies to the extent that 
eyewitnesses are 1.40 times more likely to make correct identifications when the perpetrator is 
own-race, but more likely to make misidentification when the perpetrator is of another race 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Despite the evidence supporting own-race bias, field studies have 
reported inconsistent findings, with some researchers finding an association between cross-race 
eyewitnesses and suspects and identification outcomes (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Horry et al., 
2012) and others not finding an association (Pike et al., 2002; Valentine et al., 2003; Wright & 
McDaid, 1996). In the present study, we found almost half of the real-world eyewitnesses (42%) 
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and more than three quarters of research participants (i.e., 76%) were of a different race than the 
culprit. However, it is important to note that the laboratory data on which this finding is based 
were drawn from a small number of studies (i.e., 60). This was because the majority of 
laboratory studies (i.e., 384) did not report the race of the perpetrator and research participants. 
Given the potential importance of this variable and its high occurrence in the real-world, more 
research is needed to manipulate cross-race eyewitnesses. On the other hand, if it is not feasible 
for the researcher to examine own race bias (e.g., the researcher has access to only White 
participants), researchers should consider designing studies where there are at least two 
perpetrator conditions, wherein the perpetrator is either White or non-White. Through 
conducting such studies, an opportunity will arise to determine to some extent, whether a given 
phenomenon of interest generalises for White participants across perpetrators. For example, 
Lawson and Dysart (2014) found cross-race effect in lineups but not in showup identifications. 
 Exposure to a weapon can reduce recognition accuracy in laboratory studies, as reported 
by Steblay (1992) in her meta-analysis of the phenomenon. Importantly, in contrast to archival 
studies that found no weapon-focus effect (e.g., Behrman & Davey, 2001; Valentine et al., 
2003), a recent meta-analysis conducted by Fawcett et al., (2013) indicates that the presence of a 
weapon can decrease identification accuracy in laboratory studies and in real-world 
environments, depending on context. For example, the weapon focus effect is less likely to occur 
with relatively brief or relatively long durations of weapon exposure. The meta-analysis also 
found that the weapon focus effect was smaller when the retention interval between the critical 
event and identification test was relatively long. Our comparison of real-world to simulated cases 
shows that weapons are more likely to be threatened and used in actual crimes. While a range of 
weapons were threatened against eyewitnesses in the real-world, guns were the most frequently 
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threatened (49%) in the pre-recorded simulations. In contrast, a perpetrator's hands and feet were 
the most frequently used weapons in the archives, with the use of a gun reported by 
approximately 1 in 10 eyewitnesses who were exposed to violence, a finding which is in line 
with the archival analysis conducted by Valentine et al., (2003). These results suggest additional 
avenues for laboratory research in which the effect of memory strength on identification 
accuracy is examined in relation to a range of different types of weapons including hands and 
feet. Additionally, given the potential importance of this variable, more research is needed to 
investigate how different types of weapons capture attention and whether or not weapon effect is 
exacerbated with the use of different weapons (e.g., gun vs. knife). Likewise, further research 
should examine the relationship between identification accuracy and weapon presence in relation 
to other factors that might reverse or eliminate the weapon focus effect (e.g., exposure to the 
perpetrator before he brandishes a weapon). Given the prevalence of weapons in real-world 
crimes, it is important to establish the boundary conditions of the effect. For example, research 
could investigate whether the size of the weapon focus effect varies depending on whether 
witnesses are exposed to the culprit prior to weapon exposure, or depending on the size and 
features of different types of weapons.   
Most people are likely to experience heightened stress when witnessing a crime, 
especially a violent crime. In a recent meta-analysis of laboratory studies, Deffenbacher et al., 
(2004) found that face recognition is less accurate under conditions of increased stress. In 
contrast, Wright and McDaid (1996), Horry et al., (2014) did not find an association between 
eyewitness exposure to violence and suspect identification rates in archival cases. There are 
numerous factors that possibility interact with violence exposure and that qualify whether it has 
an effect on memory accuracy. Perhaps for this reason expert consensus is relatively non-existent 
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regarding the reliability of the relationship between stress and eyewitness memory (Kassin et al., 
2001). For instance, we found that witnesses in the archives who experienced greater levels of 
violence also viewed the culprit from a shorter distance than those who were not exposed to 
violence, a finding that has also been demonstrated in a previous field study and an archival 
analysis by Yuille and Cutshall (1986) and Horry et al., (2014), respectively. In addition, Horry 
et al., (2014) found an association between heightened stress and longer exposure durations. 
These results suggest that encoding conditions that promote greater memory strength (e.g., a 
relatively short viewing distance) could attenuate the negative effect of heightened stress on 
memory (see Horry et al., 2014). Our analysis of the laboratory studies reveals that further 
eyewitness research examining the moderators of the relationship between stress and 
identification accuracy are needed. 
We found that the range of target exposure durations in the laboratory and in the field 
significantly differed. Participants who are shown the perpetrator for a longer length of time are  
more likely to make accurate identifications according to meta-analyses of laboratory studies 
(Deffenbacher et al.,, 2008; Bornstein, Deffenbacher, Penrod, & McGorty, 2012), and with 
increased suspect identifications in archival investigations (Horry et al., 2014; Valentine et al., 
2003). Whereas the length of time that the culprit was in view was less than 1 minute for only 3 
in 20 real eyewitnesses, this was the mode for subject eyewitnesses, with almost 4 in 5 given this 
limited viewing time. In addition, we found that archival witnesses viewed the culprit for 
approximately 133 minutes in rape cases, 16 minutes in robbery cases, and 10 minutes in assault 
cases. In contrast, in the laboratory studies, participants typically viewed the perpetrator for 
approximately 1.13 minutes in rape scenarios, 0.82 minutes in assault cases, and 0.54 minutes in 
robbery cases. To better understand the boundary conditions of the effects we study, we need to 
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increase the duration of exposure in our laboratory studies.  For example, are we less likely to 
obtain the own-race bias and weapon-focus effects as duration of exposure to the culprit 
increases? We strongly believe that eyewitness researchers should more routinely vary duration 
of exposure to the culprit as well as the length of the retention interval between the crime and the 
identification as a matter of course, no matter what the phenomenon of interest that they are 
investigating (e.g., own-race bias, weapon-focus effect), to assess whether the effect generalises 
across conditions. 
Further, our findings showed that the delay between the crime and when a photographic 
lineup test was administered was significantly shorter in the laboratory compared to the archives. 
While laboratory witnesses typically waited approximately 20 minutes to identify the suspect 
from a lineup, archival witnesses waited approximately 11 days. However, while these longer 
retention intervals found in the real-world might raise reasonable concerns regarding 
identification accuracy, archival witnesses were likely to be questioned about the incident within 
minutes of the crime. Turtle and Yuille (1994) raised the issue that the way in which real 
witnesses experience retention intervals might differ from laboratory witnesses. As a result, 
typical memory loss functions found in the laboratory might be different for real-world 
witnesses. In support of this argument, Ebbesen and Rienick (1998) found that the accuracy of 
recalled events did not decay over time when participants were repeatedly questioned.  
The general consensus among eyewitness experts (74% agreement) is that the use of 
showups as an identification task increases the risk of misidentification (Kassin et al., 2001). In a 
recent meta-analysis of photographic showup procedures, Steblay et al., (2003) found that 
showups yield equal hit rates. However, participants were more likely to not make an 
identification at all compared to a lineup. The latter result was qualified by suspect-perpetrator 
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similarity, as high similarity innocent suspects were more likely to be falsely identified from a 
showup. We found that live showups are the most frequently used identification task in the real-
world, presented to half of all eyewitnesses that were given an identification test. In contrast, the 
photographic lineup is most frequently used in our laboratory simulations, presented to 78% of 
subject witnesses. Only 3 experiments in the literature (Gonzalez et al., 1993; Valentine et al., 
2012; Yarmey et al., 1996) compared eyewitness accuracy in live showups to lineups. 
Additionally, like Behrman and Davey (2001), we found that positive identifications of the 
suspect were significantly higher in showups compared to lineups. Additionally, in our archival 
sample, showups were typically administered within an hour of the crime, whereas lineups were 
conducted approximately 11 days later. These findings suggest that additional research is needed 
to examine the effects of live showup procedures under varying conditions on identification 
accuracy. This is potentially fertile ground for researchers who are interested in memory, as in a 
live showup there are cues, such as suspect gait and demeanour, which might affect memory 
retrieval in a manner that is different from a photographic showup. 
While we feel that more attempts to reflect a greater range of real-world conditions would 
enhance the generalizability of laboratory studies, we acknowledge that not all conditions are 
equally feasible or ethical. Further, if research methods in a literature are similar in terms of the 
systematic errors that arise, researchers should select different methods to reduce such errors. 
This would allow for  better capturing the effects of the phenomenon of interest and test research 
hypotheses (Blankertz, 1998). The onus for the researcher to do so is amplified when the 
research will be applied in the courtroom (Weiner et al., 2002). As examples, Maass and 
Köhnken (1989), and Morgan et al. (2004) have employed creative (and still ethical) procedures 
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to create a potentially more stressful eyewitnessing situations.8 Similarly, we are not suggesting 
that all variability in conditions be removed from empirical manipulations or that better 
reflecting conditions of the real-world will address all concerns regarding the external validity of 
laboratory research. However, we do feel that in addition to utilizing multiple methodologies, 
such as laboratory studies, archival research, and studies with actual eyewitnesses, more realistic 
eyewitness simulations will strengthen our understanding of what factors influence the accuracy 
of eyewitness identifications and make us less likely to over-generalise empirical results to real-
world cases. In order to advance theory in the eyewitness memory domain, we need research that 
is high in experimental realism (i.e., studies that use controlled and artificial experimental tasks 
that nevertheless engross participants and elicit the psychological states of interest). We also 
need research that is high in mundane realism (i.e., tasks that are representative of situations that 
are like those that people might encounter outside of the laboratory) ( Aronson, & Carlsmith, 
1968). As an example of research that is high in experimental realism, one laboratory study we 
coded systematically examined the effects of distance and illumination on identification accuracy 
(Wagenaar & van der Schrier, 1996). The paper reported that accurate identifications were 
obtained from at least illumination of 15 lux and a viewing distance of no more than 15 metres. 
These results were confirmed by another study in which participants were exposed to faces of 
famous people or lookalikes (De Jong et al., 2005). However, before this research can be used in 
the courtroom (which the authors of the illumination study thought possible) research high in 
mundane realism is needed to determine how durations longer than 12 seconds (which was the 
                                                 
8 For example, the ‘weapon’ used in Mass and Köhnken (1989) was a syringe. In this study, half the participants 
were approached with a syringe and half with a pen of a similar size; and in both groups half expected to receive an 
injection. It was considered that the threat of a needle would produce a fear reaction on the basis that most people 
are in the least averse to injections, but that this would not be unethical given that injections are common place in 
experiments. In Morgan et al., (2004) in order to measure the effects of a highly stressful situation, the study was 
conducted with active-duty military personnel during military survival training. 
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exposure duration used in the illumination study) or how a live presentation of the target (instead 
of presenting a portrait, which was the case for the illumination study) might alter the functional 
relationship observed between distance, lighting, and identification accuracy. As the present 
study has shown, real world witnesses encounter perpetrators, in person, for longer than 12 
seconds. Thus, before we can generalise the findings to real world witnesses who view a live 
perpetrator in person for a given length of time, it may be important to investigate the impact of 
these factors (live presentation of the perpetrator at the given length of time) on identification 
accuracy. 
 While the goal of much of psychology is to develop universal theories of human behaviour, 
just how context insensitive experiments in the eyewitness memory domain can be before they 
lose their real-world value is an empirical issue. For example, does the videotaped showing of a 
staged crime to participants capture the essence of what it means to be a real eyewitness? 
Simulating a criminal event might be less important than, say, trying to capture other essential 
aspects of witnessing. For instance, we might speculate that features such as high situational 
ambiguity (e.g., “Am I really being robbed?”), or the need to decide within seconds how to respond 
to the situation (e.g., ‘Should I give up my person or property?’ ‘Should I fight back or run?’), are 
factors that are more important in terms of simulating the psychology of eyewitness identification 
than, say, staging for our subjects an event wherein a criminal activity is perpetrated against 
someone else. Finally, while archival studies examining eyewitness behaviour in actual criminal 
cases contribute to our understanding of eyewitness identification by allowing us to describe its 
features in natural environments, archival studies do not of course allow for a proper test of 
theoretical relationships between a factor and memory accuracy (Horry et al., 2014). Witnesses 
are not randomly assigned to conditions and numerous interrelated variables may have interactive 
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effects on memory cannot be separated; thus, it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from an 
archival analysis how a given factor influences memory. Consequently, we need to be mindful of 
the real-world conditions to which we wish to generalise our results, and design our experiments 
so that they best reflect the generalisation conditions.   
Whether we are appropriately simulating witnessing is a reasonable question to ask, for 
unlike the real-world cases, experimenters do not typically ask their participants how closely 
they paid attention, or screen out people who did not pay attention to or remember the crime (see 
Yuille & Cutshall, 1986, for an interesting discussion relating to how investigators might screen 
out witnesses who had a poor vantage point). To illustrate, Kurosawa (1996) used a typical 
staged crime scenario in a lecture hall setting and found that 33% of the participants could not 
recall seeing the staged incident. Additionally, 40-50% of the students were not able to say what 
the intruder did. Similarly, a study presenting a staged theft in a lecture hall setting reported that 
only 34 out of 147 students indicated they had witnessed the mock crime (Riske et al., 2000). 
While the police may not extensively question or ask the witness to make an identification if they 
did not attend to the crime, in “live” staged crime experiments, the results are rarely conditioned 
on such factors. Additionally, these results from Kurosawa (1996) and Riske et al. (2000) 
suggest that our crime simulations might not be as impactful as real criminal events; to our 
recollection, we coded only 3 studies (Hollien et al., 1983; Leippe et al., 1978; Hosch & 
Bothwell, 1990) reporting that subject witnesses to a staged crime attempted to intervene on 
behalf of the victim. While for obvious ethical reasons we cannot expose our participants to real 
criminal activity, studies such as these suggest that we should generalise laboratory results more 
cautiously, and that we should take seriously the issue of whether our simulations allow 
participants to be representative of real-world witnesses.  
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Overall, it is important that researchers are mindful of the ‘moderate and significant 
inverse relationship between research design and outcome’ (Welsh et al., 2010: 193; Weisburd et 
al., 2001). Accordingly, weaker research designs – particularly those which involve 
nonrandomized samples - are more likely to be prone to selection bias. Given the over 
representation of psychology university students in the laboratory studies, greater consideration 
should also be given to the diversity of the research participants to ensure they reflect the 




Our work has several limitations that must be addressed. First, one may question the 
generalisability of our sample of archival cases to other criminal cases on the basis of 
geographical considerations. While this issue cannot be addressed conclusively at this time, it is 
not entirely clear why one would expect characteristics such as exposure duration or retention 
interval lengths to differ in a systematic way in other places or at other times. Nevertheless, we 
strongly urge other researchers to conduct similar archival analyses in different jurisdictions, 
using a greater range of crime types, to further clarify how our simulations could be improved by 
better reflecting a range of actual witnessing conditions. We would also welcome further archival 
research to compare with the present findings, especially considering the age of our sample. It 
would also be fruitful for researchers to work with lawyers, police, and other legal practitioners 
at the outset of designing their research to maximise its relevance to the legal system (Weiner et 
al., 2002). Second, we sampled from cases referred to the District Attorney for prosecution. The 
characteristics of cases that do not make it to this stage of the legal system may very well be 
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different. Third, some may be concerned that a number of comparisons are based on coder 
estimations of time durations. Unfortunately, due to the nature of archival research, objective 
information of this sort is not always available. However, it is important to note that all coders 
were extensively trained and exhibited a high level of agreement when making these estimates. 
Fourth, there is also the question of whether missing data from the literature or from the archives 
may have affected our results in some way. Similarly, it is unclear that this missing information 
would drastically change the overall pattern of our results. We encourage researchers to provide 
as much detail as possible in their published reports regarding their simulations, especially for 
those factors which may affect accuracy either directly or indirectly. Fifth, construct validity 
(i.e., the certainty with which we can claim that we are measuring the theoretical concept of 
interest, such as, say, witness stress) may be compromised in archival research if the people 
reporting the data are not objective (e.g., the police conclude that the witness could not have 
been stressed, and record this in the case file, even though the witness says she was) (Wiener et 
al., 2002). Our observations, for instance, are based on observations made by police officers, 
probation officers, attorneys, and other legal officials who completed the case files. Sixth, we 
coded only a subset of the literature on face memory, concentrating our efforts on the studies that 
simulated an eyewitness memory task. Consequently, the number of studies that have 
investigated the effects of various phenomena (e.g., source monitoring, subject age, retention 
interval) on remembering is underestimated in our survey of the literature. However, had we 
included in our analysis the face memory papers that did not explicitly simulate an eyewitness 
memory task, the differences between the characteristics of the laboratory studies and the real-
world identifications in all probability would have been far greater. Seventh, we did not study 
misdemeanour archival cases. We found that the lab studies presented mainly misdemeanour 
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crimes, such as theft, as the to-be-remembered event. Had we compared theft in laboratory and 
archives, we may have found the witness ecology was similar. Finally, further work is needed to 
ascertain and study the types of real-world cases to which generalisations from the lab are made. 
We coded felony rape, robbery and assault cases because, to our knowledge, eyewitness experts 
frequently testify in these types of cases. Further research is needed to describe the witness 
ecology of other types of cases experts are called to testify about. Having said this, expert 
witnesses base their testimony in felony cases on all of the eyewitness literature. They do not 
particularise their testimony about the literature based on crime type, at least to our knowledge. 
Although there is no empirical evidence on the matter, in our view, crime type is probably less 
influential on memory accuracy than other features of crimes, such as the witness’ duration of 
exposure to the culprit, the witness’ viewing distance, and the intervals (see Ebbesen & Rienick, 
1998) between when the crime occurred and the witness’ testimony. 
 
Conclusion 
In the US, the view that eyewitness expert testimony is probative has rested in part on the 
assumption that our simulations are generalisable to actual witnessing situations. The results of 
this research project suggest that we need to broaden the range of conditions employed in the 
laboratory to increase the applicability of eyewitness identification research to the legal system 
in rape, robbery and assault felony cases. We have also proposed new avenues for eyewitness 
identification laboratory research by identifying conditions in the real-world cases that we have 
not yet represented in the laboratory, such as the effects of exposure to the culprit before the 
onset of the crime and the need for live showup research. Finally, we hope that our study will 
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prompt additional investigations into the ecology of real-world eyewitnesses. This type of 
research has potential to inform both theory and applied practice. 
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Top 10 independent variables investigated by the laboratory studies. 
 
  Independent Variable
Number of 
Experiments
1 Presence or Absence of Lineup Target 260
2 Simultaneous or Sequential Lineup 68
3 Subject Age 60
4 Lineup Instructions 47
5.5 Who target is 39
5.5 Retention Inverval 39
7 Lineup Size 34
8 What was viewed before lineup 33
9.5 Lineup Member Similarity 30
9.5 Mnemonic Techniques/Context Reinstatement 30
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Table 2   
 
Exposure duration descriptive data (in minutes) for the laboratory studies compared to the archives 
                
Critical Event Exposure Duration (minutes) 
Studies  assault rape robbery theft other crime noneb Overallc 
M 0.78 1.25 1.50 1.45 1.07 3.93 2.32 
SD 0.55 1.06 1.25 1.10 1.08 9.20 5.76 
range 0.15 to 0.57 0.50 to 2.00 0.05 to 5.50 .05 to 5.08 .08 to 3.25 .03 to 40.0 0.03 to 40.0   
median 0.57 1.25 1.03 1.25 0.75 1.00 1.00 
N 9 2 64 128 23 122 335 
Archives assault rape robbery       Overallc 
M 13.93 131.53 11.6    59.87 
SD 51.93 611.94 39.91    390.75 
range 0.08 to 540 0.50 to 7200 0.25 to 450    .08 to 7200 
median 10 10 5    8 
N 156 201 150    507 
Target Exposure Duration (minutes) 
Studies assault rapea robbery theft other crime none Overalld 
M 0.82 1.13 0.54 0.81 0.94 3.48 1.8 
SD 0.58 -- 0.48 1.48 0.92 8.58 5.58 
range 0.15 to 2.00 -- 0.03 to 1.50 
0.03 to 
15.0 0.17 to 3.00 0.03 to 40.0 0.03 to 40.0 
median 0.78 -- 0.39 0.5 0.72 0.42 0.4 
N 8 1 49 105 13 111 284 
Archives assault rape robbery    Overalld 
M 9.71 133.02 16.43    65.74 
SD 30.73 292.54 42.25    205.17 
range 0.00 to 330 0.00 to 2423 0.23 to 231     0.00 to 242  
median 2 15 5    7.8 
N 146 179 78       403 
a No further descriptive statistics other than those reported could be computed     
b Studies in which the to-be-remembered event was not criminal      
c Archive v lab: Mann-Whitney U, z = -19.91, p < .0001      
d Archive v lab: Mann-Whitney U, z = -16.41, p < .0001      
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Table 3 










Photo Showup .00 .02
Live Showup .51 <.01
Photo Lineup .40 .78
Video Lineup .00 .09
Live Lineup .03 .02
Voice Lineup .00 .01
Other .06 <.01
Unknown .00 .02
a.  Some research participants viewed mugshots and were 
then run in another identification procedure.
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Table 4 






Live Lineup    
n  = 12
Live Showup    
n  = 207
Photo Lineup   
n  = 164
Other                   
n  = 23
Suspect ID 11 (7) 189 (142) 127 (85) 17 (11)
No ID made 1 (0) 8 (8) 22 (19) 2 (1)
Other 0 (0) 10 (6) 15 (9) 4 (0)
Table note: Numbers in parentheses indicate number of known stranger identifications. 
For instance, there were 11 live lineup suspect IDs, 7 of which were stranger IDs. 
"Other" identification outcomes include multiple IDs and foil IDs.
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Table 5 
 
